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Insubstantial Burdens 
 
Chad Flanders* 
 
 Introduction 
 
Consider the following four stories, based on actual cases: 
 
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma. A prisoner, according to his religious beliefs, requires all his meals to be 
specially prepared.  As a result of a prison lockdown, he is deprived of those specially prepared 
meals for three days.  He sues, claiming that the denial of those meals has “substantially 
burdened” his practice of religion.  Has his religion been burdened, or is the denial of those 
meals de minimis? 
 
 Lifting the Veil. A woman who wears a veil according to the dictates of her religion refuses to get 
a driver’s license photo taken with the veil removed.  She is denied an accommodation, and as 
result cannot get a license.  She sues, saying that the photo requirement substantially burdened 
her free exercise of religion.  Is she right?      
 
 Spiritual bankruptcy. A bankruptcy petition preparer draws up a filing for a client.   A required 
form as part of that filing requires the preparer to list his Social Security Number.  The preparer 
believes that a person’s Social Security number is the “mark of the beast,” and so he lists his as 
000-00-0000.  The filing is rejected.  Has the preparer been substantially urdened by the 
requirement that he use his social security number on a client’s filing?     
 
 Extra paperwork.  The government mandates that all non-profit corporations provide 
contraceptive coverage to their employees unless they fill out a form stating that they object on 
religious grounds to the requirement--in which case the government will pay for the coverage.   
A religious university balks and says that even filling out the form permitting the government to 
pay for the coverage is sinful.  Are they substantially burdened by the requirement that they fill 
out a simple form asking for an exemption? 
 
In order to win a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (or “RFRA”), you have to show that 
your religious beliefs have been “substantially burdened” by a governmental law or practice.  Only then, 
according to RFRA, can you go on to press the government to show that they had a “compelling 
interest” in the law or practice.   The Hobby Lobby debate brought to light how confusing and contested 
defining what a “substantial burden” is--and the debate promises to get even more muddled in the 
wake of Hobby Lobby and subsequent challenges to the so-called contraceptive mandate.  Indeed, what 
the debate between the Hobby Lobby majority and dissent showed is not only that we don’t have an 
adequate definition of substantial burden -- we don’t even agree on how to approach the question. 
 In her dissent to Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg accused the majority of taking an approach to 
defining substantial burden that abdicated the judicial role in determining what a substantial burden 
was.  What the majority did—or what Ginsburg saw them doing—was giving the plaintiffs too much 
leeway in saying what a substantial burden on their religion was, to the extent that Alito (in Ginsburg’s 
mind) was coming close to an outright refusal to second guess any plaintiff’s statement that their 
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religion had been substantially burdened.  The Hobby Lobby decision,” says Ginsburg “elides entirely the 
distinction between the sincerity of a challenger’s religious belief and the substantiality of the burden 
placed on the challenger.”1   In her dissent to the denial of cert in the Wheaton case, Sotomayor 
advanced the same line.  “I do not doubt that Wheaton genuinely believes that signing the self-
certification form is contrary to its religious beliefs,” she wrote.  “But thinking one’s religious beliefs are 
substantially burdened—no matter how sincere or genuine that belief may be—does not make it so.”2  
 Whether or not the position Ginsburg and Sotomayor attacked was really the Court’s isn’t my 
main concern, because I think it is a position worth taking seriously.  That position—which I will call the 
“fully subjectivist view”—holds that the definition of substantial burden (and so whether there is a 
substantial burden) should be entirely up to the plaintiff.  In a phrase, you are substantially burdened if 
you say you are.  Ginsburg and Sotomayor object to this position both because they don’t think it is 
what the law says, but also and more deeply because they think it is dangerous to give plaintiffs the 
freedom to go around calling things substantial burdens when they really, objectively aren’t.  But there 
are familiar reasons to take the fully subjectivist view seriously.   Courts are ill-equipped to decode what 
people’s religious beliefs really are, and this extends to decoding when those beliefs are substantially 
burdened.  More strongly, there is a tradition that says decoding people’s religious beliefs and when 
those beliefs are burdened is really none of the court’s business.  The fully subjectivist view is a natural 
extension of these principles.   
   I feel the pull of these principles, too, and I want to resist them only slightly.  Accordingly, I 
defend in this essay what I will call the partially subjectivist view.  On this view, the courts should largely 
defer to plaintiffs as to what is a burden on their religious belief.  There is only a minor requirement that 
the plaintiffs show to make that burden substantial—and that is that the government is actually doing 
something to the plaintiffs.  Not all bad things that the government does or that have effects on one’s 
practice of religion are really burdens on you.  But if the plaintiffs do show this—that the government is 
actually pressuring them--then I think they have done all we really should require of them.  In other 
words, and to make things more concrete, in the first three examples, I think there is probably a 
substantial burden.  I am not so sure about the last case, because it may depends on facts about what 
the university really believes about its burden and whether those beliefs are factually correct.   
 My paper has four parts.  The first two shorter parts are mostly expository.  In the first part, I try 
to do some basic ground-clearing work on the concept of substantial burden.   In particular, I focus on an 
important distinction highlighted by Lupu and Tuttle, between the religious and secular costs that may 
go into defining “substantial burden.”  I think the distinction is important and analytically sound, but it 
may end up not matter much to the overall appeal of the subjectivist view; it does, however, help me 
state my thesis a more clearly.  In the second part, I describe how the two foundational cases, Sherbert 
and Yoder, give us very little help in figuring out what a substantial burden is, and especially in how we 
give meaning to “substantial.”  We are pretty much on our own.   
 In the third and fourth parts, I turn to make my argument for the partially subjectivist view.  The 
third part proceeds mostly by means of the examples I started the paper with.  Courts do a bad job of 
defining substantial burdens generally, and so they should stay away from doing so.  A lot of cases that 
get kicked out at the substantial burden stage should really last until the compelling interest stage—and 
then lose.  Other cases should be decided on grounds that the person’s religion wasn’t burdened at all, 
not that there was only a minor burden.   Although the end results are the same, it matters how we get 
there.    
In the fourth part, I lay out the partially subjectivist view.  The key thing that makes it not fully 
subjectivist is this: courts shouldn’t defer to plaintiffs as to whether something is a burden or not.  Here 
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plaintiffs seeking relief have work to do.  But if they show that the government is putting pressure on 
their religious beliefs, they have passed the burden test, and it is up to them –and their interpretation of 
their religion--whether that burden is substantial.  In a way, the partially subjectivist position holds that 
the only insubstantial burdens under RFRA are (a) those that plaintiffs say themselves are not 
substantial or (b) are not really burdens at all.  Courts should kick out only those cases where there 
really isn’t a burden, which may include some cases where plaintiffs think there is a burden—to this 
extent, thinking there’s a burden doesn’t always make it so.  What court’s shouldn’t do is kick out a case 
where there is a burden but it is supposedly “insubstantial.”   
 I should note at the outset that in a sense, my argument is quite modest.    I present it as a way 
of solving a riddle about substantial burdens in RFRA: how do we define “substantial burdens” without 
getting into the business of telling people what is or isn’t important in their religious life?  My answer is 
that we should generally defer to the subjective beliefs of plaintiffs as to what is a substantial burden.  
Importantly, my argument does not say that a scheme that adopts this view of RFRA is all told 
normatively desirable.  It is perfectly possible to say, “Yes, this is the best reading of RFRA, but then 
there is all the more reason to reject RFRA as a good law.”  In order words, my argument can just as 
easily been seen as a reductio ad absurdum of RFRA as a defense of it. 
 
I.  The Two Burdens of “Substantial Burden” 
 
 In the Hobby Lobby case, the majority found both that there was a substantial interest and—
what it assumed for the sake of argument—a compelling interest.  Famously, Hobby Lobby won because 
there was a least restrictive means the government could have taken, but didn’t.  But what was the 
burden on Hobby Lobby, and what made it substantial?  Alito in the majority opinion uses substantial or 
some variation of it in two contexts.  First and most regularly, he uses substantial in relation to the fine 
that the government would impose on Hobby Lobby if they failed to comply with the mandate.  They 
would have to pay a lot of money, Alito says; indeed, it would be an amount so great as to put 
“substantial” pressure on them to comply with the contraceptive mandate.  Second, Alito also talks of 
the burden Hobby Lobby would face in terms of their own religion: that they would have to commit a 
“scandal” by supporting people in their use of contraception and contraceptive devices they (Hobby 
Lobby) felt to be sinful.  It is here that he says it would be wrong to question the sincerity of the Hobby 
Lobby plaintiffs and that it was not the Court’s place to say that they were either “mistaken” or 
(importantly for our purposes) “insubstantial.” 
 Lupu and Tuttle have recently and rightly pointed out that the substantial burden analysis 
should usually end up encompassing two types of burdens, and the Hobby Lobby case shows how this is 
so.3 The costs of noncompliance have to be substantial, and the costs of complying have to be 
substantial as well.  Moreover, some costs will be religious costs and some will be secular.  In fact, the 
better understanding of “burden” under RFRA is to say that a plaintiff is “burdened” is she is put to a 
choice where she either has to pay substantial secular costs if she chooses not to comply with the law at 
issue, or she has to pay substantial religious costs if she does obey.  A person either has to violate her 
religious beliefs in some substantial way by obeying the law, or has to pay a steep secular cost if she 
breaks the law.  So in the context of Hobby Lobby, that choice looks something like this: 
 
Secular costs: If Hobby Lobby does not obey the contraceptive mandate, then the government 
will fine them a “substantial” amount of money. 
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Religious costs: But if Hobby Lobby does obey the contraceptive mandate, then Hobby Lobby 
will face a “substantial” burden on the practice of their religion.      
 
In the Hobby Lobby case, Hobby Lobby loses in terms of religious costs if it complies with the mandate 
(or so it says) and it loses in terms of secular costs (money, mostly) if it doesn’t comply with the 
mandate (or so we can see).  Either way, the burden is substantial for them.  More generally, the 
plaintiffs in RFRA cases need to be in a Hobson’s choice, whether either way they choose, they lose: 
substantial secular costs on the one hand, substantial religious costs on the other.  
I think Lupu and Tuttle’s analysis here is sound, and it helps me be able to state my thesis with 
more analytical clarity: I think to the extent that courts do consider it their business to determine 
whether there is a substantial religious burden, they should pretty much stop.  The only burden that 
they should even potentially be concerned with being “substantial” is the secular burden: how great was 
the secular pressure applied to the plaintiffs, and did it rise to the level of being substantial.  How much 
were the secular costs faced for not doing what the government wants?   Whether this pressure put on 
the plaintiffs also leads them to face a substantial religious burden—that is a question on which courts 
should largely defer to plaintiffs.  There is a substantial religious burden, for the most part, if plaintiffs 
say there is—that is, if they say that following the law would lead to them compromising their sincerely 
held religious beliefs.  The court is relegated to determining that the plaintiffs beliefs were religious, and 
sincerely held, and only in a very minor way, that that they were burdened. 
My major argument in this essay is that courts should not be saying whether a religious burden 
is insubstantial.  But even with determining secular—as opposed to religious--costs there are problems, 
and so I want to make three brief notes, which I’ll follow up on in later in the paper, in Part III.    
First, even if courts should determine whether there is a substantial secular cost, there is an 
initially problem in figuring how exactly they should go about doing so.  It is a very hard thing, for 
instance, to say how much money is a “substantial amount” for a corporation.  Maybe the tax penalty in 
the Hobby Lobby case really was a substantial penalty; maybe it was not.  What about a $100 a day fine 
for a millionaire?   There seem to be problems about deciding these sorts of things with any kind of 
precision, or for that matter, confidence.  And there is a further, deeper problem with defining what 
kinds of secular costs are relevant in the first place.  Braunfeld v. Brown said that a competitive 
disadvantage should not be considered a secular cost at all; Hobby Lobby seemed to have a different 
take.4  Criminal penalties seem to count, but do those penalties have to be severe?  Is a fifty dollar fine 
enough to be a substantial cost?   Is the stigma of a one dollar criminal fine bad enough?   
Maybe this is not too much of a concern, as in many cases, the secular cost will be sufficiently 
severe—a very large amount of money if I don’t comply with the mandate, a jail term if I don’t send my 
kids to school, starving if I refuse to eat non-Kosher meals—so that there won’t be a real question as to 
the pressure to conform with a governmental mandate that goes against one’s religion.  Everyone will 
agree.   Other cases—not getting a driver’s license, or not being able to play basketball—may be harder.    
Second, courts do not very often separate the secular and the religious burden.  Rather, they 
treat them as part of a single analysis: the burden is viewed as a function both of the secular cost and 
the religious cost, both of which have to be substantial (or to repeat the formula above, a “substantial 
burden” is just when the plaintiff is faced with the choice between a substantial religious cost and a 
substantial secular cost).   And when the courts do separate secular and religious costs, they will 
naturally fix on the religious cost first, because if there is no religious cost, then the secular costs just 
won’t matter.  The first two examples in my paper (prisoner’s dilemma and lifting the veil) are just like 
this. 
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But this leads me to my third point.   It may be that even when we can cleanly separate the 
religious and secular burdens, we should also defer to the plaintiff about when a secular burden is 
“substantial.”   This would be to extend subjectivism not only to religious burdens, but also to secular 
burdens; the plaintiff decides when the secular costs—giving up a benefit, or facing a penalty—are just 
too much, so much so that they put her in a position where she may feel she has no choice but to violate 
her religion.  It stands to reason that this “secular breaking point” will be different for different people 
and so long as there is a religious burden then we should it to plaintiffs to sort themselves out as to 
whether the secular burden is too much for them to bear.  Those who can bear the burden, or who 
don’t even notice, won’t sue.  Those who feel the burden will sue.  I find this extension of the 
subjectivist position attractive, but I will leave any further analysis and defense of it to the third part of 
this paper and my third example (Spiritual Bankruptcy).   
  
II.  The Limited Usefulness of Sherbert and Yoder in Defining “Substantial Burden” 
 
We could look at substantial burden philosophically, and I do want to do this (in fact, I already 
have, by noting a conceptual distinction we can make between secular and religious substantial 
burdens).  But RFRA itself tells us that we should not be guided by some abstract notion of substantial 
burden, but that we should turn to cases.  In particular, RFRA says that its purpose is to “restore” the 
test used in Sherbert v. Verner and Yoder v. Wisconsin to protect religion when it is “substantially 
burden.”5   Because the legislative history of RFRA is so murky, the guidance of the cases is perhaps the 
best tack we have in trying to figure out what the contours of a “substantial burden” are.   
But the cases don’t give us guidance about substantial burdens—in fact, they don’t even use the 
phrase.6   Even worse, they aren’t that conceptually illuminating on what counts as a more or less 
substantial burden.   Either they say too little, as in Sherbert, or they say too much, as in Yoder.  Sherbert 
doesn’t give us much idea of what a substantial burden is (although it does give us some sense of what a 
burden is).  Yoder may in the end just give us one example of a really substantial religious burden—and 
so not be that helpful in defining the threshold of when a religious burden just barely becomes 
“substantial.”   What Shebert and Yoder tell us, maybe indirectly, is that defining substantial burden is 
just hard.  This in turn may further persuade us of the benefits of avoiding a judicial determination of 
substantial burden, and adopting a subjectivist position on the matter.  In other words, the failure of 
caselaw to yield any good answers in the end pushes us to something like a philosophical point about 
deferring to plaintiffs.   
Begin, then, with Sherbert.   The key issue in that case was not really about whether the burden was 
substantial or insubstantial, but rather whether even indirect burdens could count as burdens for the 
sake of the First Amendment analysis.  Here the Court held that they could: even if the consequences of 
a law might only be an “indirect result” of welfare legislation, that would only be the “the beginning, not 
the end of our inquiry,” for a law that indirectly burdened religious observance would still burden 
religious observance.  Thus, the answer to what the Court called its “first question”—whether a 
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disqualification for benefits imposed “any burden” on the free exercise of religion—was yes, whether or 
not that burden is direct or indirect.7 
 Note that the Court chose to use the phrase “any burden” rather than “any substantial burden.”  
And as if to show it did not care about the degree of burden imposed, here are some things the Court 
did not do.  The Court did not ask whether attending worship on Saturdays was a central or even 
required part of her Seventh Day Adventism.  So the Court did not seem especially concerned to 
measure the extent of the religious cost to Sherbert.  The Court also did not investigate the value of the 
unemployment benefits Sherbert would not get if she decided not to work rather than to violate her 
religious beliefs.  It did not for that matter look into how wealthy Sherbert was—that is, into whether 
she really needed the unemployment compensation to survive or to lead a tolerable existence, although 
presumably she had to fall below a certain level in order to be eligible for benefits.  So neither did the 
Court inquire into the actual, financial burden on Sherbert—and test whether that secular burden was 
substantial.   
However, when discussing how to balance the compelling state interest with the burden on 
Sherbert, the Court does suddenly switch to speaking in terms of whether the “infringement” of—not 
the burden on—Sherbert’s First Amendment rights is “substantial.”8  But the very phrasing should make 
us wary of what the Court means, if indeed means anything.  Usually we speak in terms of whether a 
right is violated or not, and not in terms of whether that violation was substantial.  Compare this to how 
we deal with governmental interests: here there is a sliding scale, from hypothetical to substantial to 
compelling.  Not so with rights.  Rights are either violated or they are not.  We might think that an 
insubstantial burden led to no rights violation.  But it might be odd to say that an insubstantial burden 
led to an insubstantial infringement.9   
Yoder, by contrast, does speak in terms of “unduly” burdening the free exercise of religion, a phrase 
it uses in summarizing the holding in Sherbert.10  And the rest of Yoder does seem to care and care very 
much that the burden on the Amish religious belief was more than minor.  The Amish were threatened 
with criminal penalties if they didn’t comply, a serious secular cost (although the fine involved was only 
$5 per defendant).  The requirement of compulsory secular education appeared to hit at the 
fundamentals tenet of their religion, at least according to Justice Burger.  Burger even suggests that 
compliance with the educational mandate would possibly mean the destruction of the Amish religion, 
what Burger calls the “objective danger” that the free exercise clause was designed to avoid.  So we 
have the language of not just serious costs to the Amish qua persons (criminal penalties) but to the 
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Amish qua Amish—that is qua religious believers.  They are caught between a heavy secular cost and a 
heavy religious cost.   
Does this, then, help answer our question as to what a “substantial burden” is?  Sort of.  The burden 
in Yoder seems extreme, and Burger takes pains to emphasize how “burdensome” the burden at issue is.  
But by going so far in the direction of specifying the extreme nature of the burden, Yoder for all its detail 
about the nature of the burden faced may end up being as unhelpful as Sherbert was in its lack of detail.  
The fact that we know that something is certainly a burden, that whatever a burden ends up being this 
certainly is one, is not the best way to get at the definition of a burden.  To say that something is 
“expensive” if it costs a billion dollars, it turns out, tells us very little about the nature of 
“expensiveness.”  How do we decide when it comes to deciding whether something that costs only 50 
dollars is expensive?   
More specifically, here are two things we don’t know after Yoder: (1) whether something is only a 
substantial burden if it involves the violation of “fundamental tenet” of a religion,11 (2) whether 
something is only a substantial burden if the very existence of a religion is threatened.  What happens 
when something less than these things are involved?  Do we still have a burden?  For all we know of 
Yoder, a substantial burden might only be a burden if the law at issue has to violate a central tenet of 
the religion, and has to risk the destruction of the religion.  Knowing an extreme application of a concept 
doesn’t get at what the ordinary or usual application might be.   And so we may be not very much 
further than we were at after Sherbert.  Sherbert said that there had to be a burden, but didn’t say how 
great the burden had to be—or even if it had to be great at all.  Yoder says that a very great burden is a 
burden.  So: what is a substantial burden? 
 
III.  Finding An Insubstantial or No Burden: Some Problems and a Very Short Argument for 
Judicial Avoidance 
 
     Of course, the fact that Sherbert and Yoder don’t by themselves tell us what a substantial burden is 
and at best give unsure guidance does not mean that defining “substantial burden” is an impossible 
task.  Many circuits courts have done it, and have offered various and conflicting answers.  Maybe one 
of those is the right answer, and the one that provides a standard for determining when there is a 
burden and when that burden is substantial.  But here I want to approach the question of substantial 
burdens from a different angle, with the question of when a burden is so minor, it counts as an 
insubstantial burden.   
Where circuit courts seem most ready to employ a doctrine of insubstantial burdens—as 
opposed to a doctrine of when something is a substantial burden--is in cases involving the religious 
freedom of prisoners.  The logic of developing such a doctrine is obvious.  As then-Judge Sotomayor put 
it, “The substantial burden test, however, presupposes that there will be cases in which it comfortably 
could be said that a belief or practice is so peripheral to the plaintiff's religion that any burden can be 
aptly characterized as constitutionally de minimis.”12  If there are substantial burdens, there are also 
going to be burdens that are not substantial (if not actually, then at least possibly).  If courts have been 
able to consistently and precisely say when a burden is insubstantial, this may be able to give us 
insight—by comparison—as to when a burden is “substantial.”  Kick out the insubstantial burdens, and 
what you have left are the substantial ones.   
 I am going to argue in this part that courts that have developed this kind of doctrine have made 
a mess of it—not because they have misapplied the doctrine of insubstantial burdens, but because such 
a doctrine seems to be inherently messy.  In involves drawing fine lines, and lines that moreover courts 
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are not good at drawing and really have no business drawing.  Better that courts stay out of it, and if 
substantial burden needs to be defined, leave it to the plaintiff.  What is even more frustrating about 
these cases, too, is that many of them should have come out the same way, viz., with the plaintiff losing.  
But the plaintiff should have lost not because there wasn’t a burden, but because the state interest is 
normally “compelling.”   
I proceed in this part by going through the first three examples that I led off my paper.   Because 
courts apply the insubstantial (religious) burdens doctrine so often in prisoners’ rights cases, I start with 
an example of one of those—the prisoner’s dilemma.  I then consider two other situations—lifting the 
veil, and spiritual bankruptcy--where courts found no substantial burden and argue against the court’s 
holdings in those cases, too.  In each case, I try to say (a) why I find what the court does so unpersuasive, 
and (b) suggest a better way of analyzing the case.  The upshot of this part, if I am successful, should be 
that courts should not define many (if any) religious burdens as insubstantial and they don’t need to in 
order to get the right results in those cases.  In considering the third example, I stretch the point 
tentatively: maybe the courts shouldn’t even be deciding when there is substantial secular pressure on 
people to modify or change their religious beliefs.  
 
A. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
A good example of the application of the “insubstantial burdens” doctrine comes in a brief, 
unpublished opinion from the Third Circuit, which is so short and so slight (and so dismissive) that it 
rehearses the basic facts in a footnote.   A prison in Lewisburg, PA, was put on lockdown, where all 
prisoners were confined to their cells.13   The lockdown began around lunch at May 15, 2005, and ended 
about three days later—breakfast, May 18.   Because of the lockdown, Michael Norwood “did not 
receive a religious certified (halal) meal,” as he usually received.   By the court’s own count that meant 
Norwood didn’t get his halal meal seven times.  The court’s question: Did the deprivation of his certified 
meals mean that Norwood’s religion was “substantially burdened”? 
 The court begins by rehearsing the general rule that deprivation of meals can be the basis of a 
successful claim.  Cases “generally indicate,” the court writes, “that prison administrators must provide 
an adequate diet without an inmate’s religious dietary restrictions in order not to unconstitutionally free 
burden free exercise rights.”14  We can expand a little on what the cases generally indicate.  Many 
religions put a premium on eating correctly and not defiling the body with certain foods.  So prisoners 
who have—sincere—religious beliefs and those beliefs require a certain diet, can obviously be burdened 
if they don’t get those meals.   If they are not served those meals, then they also face a real hardship.  In 
some cases, they may not be able to eat the full meal they are served, so they may end up with a 
nutritionally inadequate diet.  If they can’t eat any of the meal because it is not certified, then they risk 
starving.  As the Third Circuit closes its summary of the cases, “in essence” there is a “right not to be 
forced into a Hobson’s choice of either eating food items which offend one’s religious beliefs, or eating 
very little or not at all.” 15 
 But then the court distinguishes the Norwood case from its past cases, saying “the issue here … 
is much more circumscribed,” that is, it is only (the court says) about whether a “short denial” is a 
substantial burden or a mere “de minimis intrusion.”16  This is the distinction that (what I’ve been 
                                                          
13
 The emergency lockdown was initiated in Norwood “following an altercation between inmates[ ] representing 
certain volatile geographical and racial groupings.” Def.'s Statement of Facts, Norwood v. Strada, No. 1:05–cv–2410 
(M.D.Pa. Feb. 21, 2006), ECF No. 18, Ex. 2, ¶ 3. 
14
 Norwood v. Strada, 249 F. App'x 269, 271 (3d Cir. 2007). 
15
 Id. at 272. 
16
 Id.   
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calling) the insubstantial burdens doctrine invites: that there may be some actual burdens on religious 
practice that are nonetheless so minor, so trivial, that we can freely invoke the maxim that the law does 
not care about small things.  And the court finds that doctrine holds here.   The amount of time, and the 
number of meals missed, was just not substantial enough of a burden for the law to take note.   
 One might have been able to see the problem if the opinion had ended here, but the court goes 
on to cite a case—for comparison-- from the Second Circuit where  the court found that denial of one 
meal, if that meal is unique enough and important enough.  So the question for the Norwood court has 
to be: why is it that denial of one meal could be sufficient for a substantial burden, if that meal is special 
enough, but that seven meals is de minimis?  There are factual problems here (do we know that none of 
the meals Norwood missed was “special”?), but also problems of deep incommensurability.  Do we 
know how many missed regular religious meals is the equivalent of the denial of one special religious 
meal?  And couldn’t every religious meal be “special” for the believer?  (In fact, I believe that this is 
almost certainly the case.) 
 The line drawing problems are, it seems to me, insurmountable, and appear in other cases that 
try to draw a line between substantial and insubstantial violations.  In a case that distinguishes 
Norwood, the court finds that denial of thirty-six meals over a twelve day span (with a few more 
complicating factors which I put to the side here) amounted to substantial burden.17  That case in turn 
cites a New York case that found a substantial burden where the plaintiff was denied “at least one” 
religious meal a day for fifteen days.  Where does the balance tip in days and meals from substantial to 
insubstantial?  It is hard, probably impossible, to say.   
 But there is a second problem in the court’s analysis in Norwood as well.   The way the court 
cashes out its decision is by saying that “it is incredible that in such a short time period Norwood would 
have been forced to abandon one of the precepts of his religion, or that he would have felt substantial 
pressure to modify his beliefs.”18  The way the court speaks, it is as if the violation of Norwood’s religion 
is something prospective—something that may or (more likely) may not happen in the future, as the 
result of his not getting seven certified meals.  The pressure he faced wasn’t enough, the court seems to 
say, for him to give up his religious beliefs.  But that’s just wrong, or at least it is it hard to parse.  
Presumably, for Norwood, the violation of his religious has already happened: he has already eaten non-
certified meals.  By skipping the religious meals, Norwood was “abandon[ing]” one of the “precepts of 
his religion.”  He is suing because he has violated his religious beliefs, and because he was forced to, by 
the lockdown—and to Norwood, this violation was not a small thing.         
This conclusion (that Norwood’s beliefs were substantially burdened) doesn’t mean that 
Norwood should have won.  In fact, he probably should have lost.  And the reason the prisoner should 
lose is that in nearly every case is because the government interest is usually compelling enough to 
outweigh any burden on the prisoner.  Take as a good counterexample, the case of Singson v. Norris out 
of the Eighth Circuit.19  In that case, Singson said that the prison policy of requiring her to check out tarot 
cards from a chaplain violated her right under RLUIPA because it prevented “spontaneous” card 
readings.   The court noted that no one had challenged Singson’s religious sincerity; presumed there was 
a burden; and then in two paragraphs explained the security concerns of the prison and found for the 
state.  The analysis is in the end about as short, and much more persuasive, than that in the Norwood 
opinion.   The Norwood court involves itself unnecessarily in a muddle.  
 
B.  Lifting the Veil 
 
                                                          
17
 Potts v. Holt, No. 3:CV-12-1441, 2014 WL 1371911 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2014). 
18
 Norwood v. Strada, 249 F. App'x 269, 272 (3d Cir. 2007) 
19
 Singson v. Norris, 553 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 2009).   
10 
 
Another example of the misuse of the insubstantial burdens comes in the case of Freeman v. 
Department of Highway Safety.  In that case, Sulataan Lakiana Myke Freeman argued that it was against 
her religion to be photographed without a veil—something the Florida Department of Highway Safety 
required if she was to have a driver’s license.20  Freeman testified that, for her, Islam meant that it was 
“not an option” for her to have a photograph taken of her without a veil, and that the Department 
impermissibly put her to a choice between violating her religious beliefs or not being able to drive.  At 
trial, both sides had religious experts.  The state’s expert testified to the Islamic religious doctrine of 
“necessity” that allowed photography of the face in certain circumstances.  Freeman’s expert denied 
that the doctrine of necessity applied to removing the veil in order to take a driver’s license photograph, 
although it could possibly apply in other contexts.   
Was there a substantial burden here?   The issue was considered at both the circuit level, and 
then on appeal at the trial level.   Interestingly, the two courts ended up reaching the same result, and 
with fairly similar (bad) reasoning.  They found against Freeman, which is possibly the right result.   But 
consider two ways the courts could have gone, or at least emphasized more.  The courts could have said 
that not being able to drive is not a serious cost, and so the loss of that benefit (as opposed to, say, the 
loss of a welfare benefit, as with Sherbert), did not put substantial secular pressure on Freeman to be 
photographed without a veil.  She could just walk away.21  Or one might imagine the courts saying that 
there was a burden, but that the state’s interest in a system of photo identification for drivers 
outweighed it.22   In fact, the trial court did say the latter, but only as an alternate holding—and only 
after making it clear that it didn’t really need to reach the issue of the state’s interest at all.23  The circuit 
court and district court put most of their eggs in a different basket. 
 The trial court opinion, to begin with, is confused, even if it is not as confused as the circuit court 
opinion.24  The district court first held that Freeman could not sincerely hold that photographs of her 
face were impermissible, because she believed that photographs of women wearing veils were OK and 
because her husband, who ostensibly shared her religion, was willing to be photographed for his driver’s 
license.  Put aside the question of whether another family member’s interpretation of religious belief 
should matter at all to the rest of the family.  And put aside the general uncharitableness of the trial 
court’s parsing of Freeman’s religious beliefs.  There is at least something to the court’s inquiry: the 
                                                          
20
 Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
21
“In its appeal, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles first argues that the trial court erred in finding coercive state action. 
The gist of this argument is that there is no ‘right’ to drive in this state, rather, driving is merely a privilege. In other 
words, the state's position is that no First Amendment problem is raised where a citizen's free exercise right is 
brought into conflict with a mere privilege.”  Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 
N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 1978). 
22
 “Finally, the Bureau contends that the trial court erred in rejecting its attempt to show a compelling state 
interest in the photograph requirement. At trial, the Bureau advanced two purposes for the photo requirement 
which it felt were of sufficient importance to constitute an interest which should outweigh the infringement upon 
the appellees' rights. These purposes were summarized in appellant's brief as follows:‘(T)he state has a duty to 
continually insure the competency of Indiana drivers by testing knowledge of the laws of the road, testing the 
ability to drive, and constantly checking each driver's knowledge, ability and obeyance. It is only through proper 
identification that such continual checking can be made by the various law enforcement, judicial, and 
administrative officers who aid the Bureau of Motor Vehicles in its responsibility.’”  Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. 
Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 1978).    
23 See Freeman v. State, 2003 WL 21338619, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 6, 2003) (holding, in the alternative, that photo 
identification was “necessary to support the compelling state interests of promoting public safety and security, 
combatting crime and of protecting interstate commerce”).   
24
 Freeman v. State, 2003 WL 21338619 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 6, 2003). 
11 
 
court did seem genuinely befuddled by the nature of Freeman’s belief system, and how she could hold it 
sincerely.   
But the court said more.   The district court held that the act of taking the photograph did not 
burden Freeman either, because the process of getting photographed was brief, and the photo could be 
taken in a private room, and she need not actually show the photograph to anyone except law 
enforcement officers.  The court found that this burden wasn’t substantial.  But in finding this, the court 
simply contradicted what Freeman said her beliefs were, and what she said the burden on her actually 
was, viz., that she remove her veil for the sake of taking a driver’s license photo.   Of course, if one 
thought (as the trial court apparently did) that Freeman wasn’t sincere about that her beliefs, then it 
follows that violating her insincerely held beliefs would not be a burden, let alone a substantial one.  It is 
not obvious why the trial court even went on to the next step of assessing whether the burden was 
substantial, when it should have just stopped with the finding that she was insincere. 
 The circuit court was more explicit that it was adopting something like the insubstantial burdens 
doctrine.  Some things were mere inconveniences, and this was one of them: Freeman’s “veiling practice 
is ‘merely inconvenienc[ced]’ by the photograph requirement” and not substantially burden.  But the 
way the court applies this doctrine is hard to follow.   After finding that Freeman’s beliefs were sincere, 
it goes on to side with the state’s expert that veiling is really not required in the context of getting one’s 
driver’s license picture taken—all that really needs accommodating is beliefs that the photograph be 
taken in a certain context (e.g., by using a female photographer).25   The court seems to be saying that 
there is no burden here at all, not that there was only a mere inconvenience.  The court is applying a 
doctrine that doesn’t really apply if what it says elsewhere in its opinion is true (again, something similar 
seems true about the lower court opinion as well). 
 What the court is doing, I think, is disguising its finding that the plaintiff wasn’t sincere in the 
language of in substantial burdens.   Freeman says she abides by Islamic law, but Islamic law doesn’t 
forbid unveiling for a driver’s license photograph.  This might be right, but it is not the same as saying 
that unveiling for a driver’s license photograph is only an insubstantial burden.  It is saying that there 
really is no burden in the first place, because the state is not putting Freeman in a position to violate her 
religious beliefs.   
 Why put the blame for the result in this case on the insubstantial burdens or “mere 
inconvenience” doctrine?   Because what the circuit court did, I think, was to reason this way: there are 
photographs in other circumstances allowed by Islamic law, so one more photograph is a most de 
minimis burden on Freeman’s religion.   But how do we know this?  Here we have the same puzzle as 
how we know that denying thirteen meals is a substantial burden, but denying seven is not.   And in the 
Florida case, the problem is much more obvious.   Freeman saw the photograph not just as an 
incremental burden on her, but as crossing a (to her) bright line from permissible to impermissible.  This 
is why I think what the court really was doing was saying that they didn’t believe Freeman; that she was 
being insincere that her religion required no driver’s license photo; and accordingly, one more 
photograph wouldn’t hurt.26  If the court were more transparent in its reasoning, they would have found 
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 Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
26
 “The reasoning of the court in Freeman is problematic for several additional reasons. First, as previously 
discussed, there are many interpretations of Islamic principles and one expert's opinion may not reflect the 
religious beliefs of other Muslims. Freeman's expert even testified that the Islamic exceptions did not apply to 
state license photographs.  It is a vast leap of logic for an individual to infer that because Islam makes exceptions 
for medical necessity and identification for burial purposes in addition to a few other exceptions, that such 
exceptions extend to DMV photo requirements. Second, the court should not have considered Saudi Arabia's 
practices to support the idea that photo requirements in the United States should be required. The social and 
cultural aspects of Saudi Arabian society and American society are incomparable. It is also overly simplistic to 
assume that Saudi practices would necessarily adhere to Islamic principles, or Freeman's religious beliefs. Freeman 
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no burden, not an insubstantial one.  I still don’t think this is the right result—but it at least it would 
have been more honest.    
 
C.  Spiritual Bankruptcy 
 
The previous two examples were of courts finding an insubstantial burden, or mere 
inconvenience, on the plaintiff’s practice of religion.  In the prison case, the court found the burden to 
be de minimis.  In the driver’s license case, the court found the burden to be a mere inconvenience.  
Importantly, both were examples of a court finding an insubstantial religious burden and neither court (I 
think) did a very good job.  In the prison case, the court drew an arbitrary line between what was a 
substantial burden and what was an insubstantial one.  In the driver’s license case, the court found the 
burden on Freeman to be a mere inconvenience, although their reasoning in fact suggests that the court 
really thought there was no burden.   In both cases, the court second-guessed or just plain rejected the 
religious beliefs of the plaintiff—either because those beliefs were “substantially burdened” (Norwood) 
or ultimately not burdened at all (Freeman). 
     In a case which involved, in part, the complaint of a prisoner about being deprived of properly 
blessed food, Judge Guido Calabresi laid out why having courts determining what burdens are 
substantial or not is a bad idea.  “Our founding principles require that courts resist the dangerous 
temptation to try to judge the significance of particular devotional obligations to an observant 
practitioner of faith.”27  Calabresi quotes from the Supreme Court next: It is not within the “judicial ken” 
to question the “centrality of certain beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ 
interpretations of those creeds.”28   Both of those faults are on display in the above two examples: to say 
that missing a religious meal is somehow de minimis is to question how central even a single meal might 
be someone like Norwood; and to say that Islamic law just does allow driver’s license photos is to  
question the validity of Freeman’s interpretation of her creed.   Calabresi’s insights in that opinion are 
well taken—as is his ultimate decision to reverse and remand the judgment that there was no 
substantial religious burden.  Calabresi does mention the insubstantial burdens doctrine, but he is 
hesitant to embrace it and he flirts with the idea of giving up on substantial burden talk altogether.  
Rejecting the substantial burden test—or at least most of it—is what I want to urge, especially when it 
comes to assessing what is or is not a substantial religious burden. 
 But I think related problems come up in trying to define what a substantial secular burden is, 
and I want to consider a case where the issue is whether there is substantial secular pressure on the 
plaintiffs.  I speculated that the Freeman court might have decided her case on secular grounds, by 
finding that the loss of a driver’s license was not a serious burden in its own right: this may not have 
been right (other courts have held that loss of the right to drive is a serious loss), but at least it would 
not have involved the court in questioning the religious side of Freeman’s burden.  But can we construct 
a workable test for substantial secular burden?  And even if we can, might such a test bring us too 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
is an American convert to Islam, and has no connection to Saudi Arabia or its practices. Finally, the court was in no 
position to decide what Freeman's religion required. When dealing with Christian plaintiffs in Quaring and 
Pentecostal House of Prayer, the court did not look to mainstream Christianity to determine whether the religion 
prohibited photographs, it looked to the individual plaintiff's beliefs.”  Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the 
United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS 
RACE & POVERTY L. J. 441, 492 (2008) 
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 McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2004) 
28
 McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 
(1989)). 
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close—if not exactly crossing over—into second-guessing the religious burden on the plaintiff as well?29   
 In re: Turner involved Jim Snyder who was a “bankruptcy petition preparer,” who had prepared 
a filing for a couple declaring bankruptcy.30  The filing, as far as we know, was in good order but there 
was one problem: where the document said to put the preparer’s Social Security number, he instead put 
ten zeros (“00000000”).  Snyder believed that the government imposed Social Security number was the 
“mark of the beast,” as described in various Christian scriptures.  Snyder was given a number, but—he 
said—he had renounced it.   He faced, in part, a fine for not putting his number on the filing.   
 Snyder brought suit, saying his right to religious freedom under the First Amendment had been 
violated; the court, sua sponte, also considered a RFRA claim under the facts.   For the RFRA claim, the 
court found Snyder’s beliefs were sincere, but that the question of whether his religion had been 
substantially burdened was not even “close.”  The privilege of “being a bankruptcy petition preparer” 
just wasn’t a substantial cost that Snyder’s faced—certainly not as substantial as losing one’s welfare 
benefits or one’s driver’s license (and here the court cited cases where those benefits were denied to 
people who refused to disclose their Social Security numbers).31  Snyder’s “burden’ was far more like a 
Sikh who could not enlist in the Army because he couldn’t comply with the military’s dress code—one 
had the right to dress as one’s wished, but one didn’t have the right to enlist.  So too with Snyder: he 
had the right not to use his Social Security number, but he didn’t have the right to be a bankruptcy 
petition preparer.32 
   It is not obvious that being denied the ability to work a certain job isn’t a substantial burden, 
and the case relied on by the court was decided before Goldman, a case which shows why the reasoning 
in the 9th circuit case is dubious: the key thing isn’t that there wasn’t a burden; the key thing is that the 
military has a very strong interest in uniformity.33  It’s not that there’s no right to enlist, it’s that the right 
to enlist can be outweighed by a strong government interest.   The bankruptcy case is harder, we might 
think, because the state interest in having a preparer’s Social Security number on the form is lesser (and 
presumably also easier to accommodate). 
 But put that to one side.  Maybe the court got the secular cost of giving up one’s job wrong—
but maybe it got it right.  Maybe not being able to be in a particular line of work is a lot less bad than not 
getting welfare benefits or not being able to drive.  That is at least arguable.   Still, is there anything 
particularly problematic about the court saying that a secular burden is not substantial, and on that 
basis finding that there was no substantial burden on the exercise of a person’s religion?  I think there is, 
and it has to do with more than the fact that drawing the substantial/non-substantial secular burden 
line is hard (as I mentioned above).  Of course it is hard, but many judgments that courts have to make 
are hard.  It has to do, also, with the fact that even when the court says that the secular burden is not 
that great, this still goes into an overall judgment that the burden on one’s religion is not substantial. 
 I said, above, that courts should be reluctant to second-guess when a person is facing a 
substantial religious burden—that they shouldn’t say, for instance, that missing one sacred meal is not 
that bad, or that their religion doesn’t really forbid them from taking a driver’s license photo without 
wearing a veil.  But maybe it is also the case that courts should be reluctant to second-guess when a 
person says he or she is facing some sort of substantial secular pressure to go against his or her religion.  
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 Here I follow up on the promissory note made at the end of Part I.   
30
 In re Turner, 193 B.R. 548 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) 
31
 The fine that Synder faced didn’t seem to factor into the analysis of the court.   
32
 This seems to miss the point of having accommodations in the first place, viz., so that people don’t have to 
choose between doing their job and practicing their religion.   
33
 “[T]he First Amendment does not require the military to accommodate such practices in the face of its view that 
they would detract from the uniformity sought by the dress regulations.”  Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 
509-10 (1986). 
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That too is a judgment about that person’s religion, or at least her relationship to it: what kinds of 
pressures might make her go against what her religion says, and how serious those pressures have to be 
before she bends or breaks.  This may, in turn, be a function about how important a particular part of 
her religion is to the plaintiff.34  Even if we can analytically separate religious and secular burdens—per 
Lupu and Tuttle--maybe our respect for religious freedom should extend to deferring to when a plaintiff 
says that there is substantial secular cost at play as well.  At the least, such a position does not seem to 
me implausible. 
 
IV. 
 
 The previous Part goes nearly all of the way toward making my argument that courts should stay 
away from saying whether or not there has been a substantial religious burden on the plaintiff.  It’s too 
hard, and it ends up with courts messing around (and messing up) in areas that they have no special 
competence in, and that there are good reasons for them to stay away from.  Courts don’t know when 
missing a religious meal is a substantial burden, and when it’s a mere inconvenience.  Nor do they 
know—nor should they be deciding—what interpretation of Islamic law is correct.   Leave these 
judgments to the plaintiffs.  If the burden is substantial enough to them, they’ll sue.  Indeed, there’s 
even a case to be made that courts should not be in the business of determining when there’s a 
substantial secular burden, if only that this is a way of really steering clear of any religious debates.  
Courts should stick to compelling interests and least restrictive means, and stay out of substantial 
burdens. 
 Or at least they should mostly stay out of substantial religious burdens.  There is a threshold 
determination of burden that courts must make, and in this Part I describe what that is.  Courts have to 
refuse to apply RFRA in cases where there is no burden at all on the plaintiff, and they cannot leave it to 
the religious plaintiff to say whether there is or is not a burden.  If there’s no burden, the person 
shouldn’t be able to get any relief under RFRA.   My argument to this conclusion is going to take two 
steps.  First, I’m going to examine a case (Lyng) where there may be an impact on the religious believers 
practice, but there won’t be a burden.  In this case, the plaintiff fails at the threshold level – he fails to 
show that there is what we can call a bare burden.  If there’s no “bare burden,” then the plaintiff may 
suffer a real cost to his religion but he isn’t being burdened by the government.  In the second step, I’ll 
look closely at a case where there is this bare burden (Bowen).  I’ll close by considering the last example 
from the beginning of the paper, Extra Paperwork.   
 
A.  The “Bare Burden” Requirement 
 
We’ve so far been talking about when something is or isn’t a substantial burden – for the most part 
keeping the words “substantial” and “burden” together.  But what makes something a burden in the 
first place, whether or not that burden is substantial?  The classic “no burden” case is Lyng, but there 
have been other cases that have followed in Lyng’s wake and making pretty much similar points.35  In 
Lyng the Court held the fact that the United States Forest Service was going to pave a road through a 
site traditionally used for religious purposes by Native Americans didn’t amount to a “substantial 
burden.”   In an analogous circuit level court case, Navajo Nation, also against the Forest Service, the 
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 A plaintiff may consider it a small thing to lose one’s job in order to preserve some of her religious beliefs.  Does 
this mean that the secular cost should be considered by the court to be insubstantial?  It seems not.   
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 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) 
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Ninth Circuit ruled that the use of recycled wastewater to make snow on a mountain considered 
“sacred” by some Indian tribes was also not a burden.36   
These cases were correctly decided, I think, and they can help us draw the line between when there 
is a burden and when there is not, but from another angle they are deeply counterintuitive.  In Lyng, the 
Court says a little dismissively that the destruction of their sacred space (and their replacement with a 
paved road) would make the practice of the tribes’ religion more difficult.  But the logic of the Court’s 
position seems to be that the road could even make the practice of their religion impossible and it 
wouldn’t affect the judgment of the court that there was “no burden”—and the Court says as much.  So 
too, in Navajo Nation, the court admits that even if the mountain was not just polluted with recycled 
snow but simply blown up, there would not be a burden.   
We should want to know why, in these cases, making something harder to do (or even making 
something impossible) does not count as a burden or as burdening the practice of their religion.   After 
all, forcing the Amish to send their children to secular schools makes it harder for them to practice their 
religion—and that, the Court says, is part of the burden in Yoder.   The Court even said that there was 
really a burden in Yoder because secular education threatened the destruction of the Amish religion.  
Why can’t we say then, that there is a burden in Lyng or Navajo?   The government practices there, too, 
risked destroying the Indians’ ability to practice their religion, and so there is a perfectly ordinary sense 
in which both Lyng and Navajo involve burdens on belief.37   
 What distinguishes Yoder from the Indian cases is the idea that the Forest Service wasn’t really 
doing anything directly to the tribes, wasn’t making them do anything, wasn’t putting them to a choice 
between their faith and a penalty.  As the court put it in Lyng, the actions of the government didn’t have 
the “tendency to coerce” anybody into “acting contrary to their beliefs.”38   The Ninth Circuit in Navajo 
echoed Lyng precisely on this point: the government may have destroyed their site of worship, but they 
wasn’t coercion.  The Ninth Circuit seemed to be saying: if the government destroys your sacred site, but 
doesn’t force you to do anything, it isn’t much different than if an avalanche did the damage.  It’s a bad 
thing, but it’s not a burden.   
In Yoder, the state of Wisconsin was coercing the Amish to send their kids to secular schools, on pain 
of government sanction (a fine or jail time).   There wasn’t just a tendency to coerce—there was 
coercion: “Send your kids to a secular school or face a fine and possibly jail time.”  In Lyng and Navajo, 
the government is just saying, “We are going to end up probably destroying or defiling some of your 
sacred sites.  We are very sorry about this, but at the same time we are not making you do anything—
except perhaps suffer the consequences.”  Maybe the mere existence of secular schools makes it harder 
for the Amish to practice their religion; some parents might be tempted to send their kids to those 
schools.  For that matter, maybe a lot of facts about the modern world make the Amish religion more 
difficult to practice.  But it is only when the government says “send your kids to these schools or else x 
will happen” that we have a burden.   And so maybe the destruction of the forest or the mountain 
makes it harder for the tribes to practice their religion.  But until there is a choice that the tribes have to 
face, until some pressure is put on the tribes by the government, we don’t have a burden.39    
Call this requirement I see under RFRA that there has to be some sort of pressure put on the 
plaintiff—as opposed to just something bad that happens that makes practicing his or her religion more 
difficult—the requirement that there be a “bare burden.”  The plaintiff has to show this, and the Court 
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 A point made with great persuasiveness by the dissent in Navajo.   
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has to agree that there is a bare burden.   And on this question, there should be no deferring to the 
plaintiff.  That is, the plaintiff has to show that something the government is doing is putting pressure on 
her to change or modify her religious beliefs.  She cannot say the government is burdening her just 
because the government has done something that makes the practice of her beliefs more difficult: it has 
to be doing something to her, where she is being put to a choice where that choice involves some 
secular costs.  This is the “bare burden” requirement, and it is what makes my view only partially 
subjectivist.  I am willing to defer to the plaintiff as to whether a burden on her religion is “substantial.”  
I am not willing to defer to the plaintiff as to whether there is a burden at all.40  
 
B. Extra Paperwork 
 
Lyng isn’t the only case that helps us get a handle on the “no burden” requirement.  Before there 
was Lyng, there was Bowen, which although a mess procedurally is illuminating as to the line between 
no burden and a substantial burden, and to my mind is the best case to help shed light on the most 
recent round of challenges to the ACA under RFRA.41  Bowen dealt with not one, but two alleged 
burdens.  The first was an objection by the father to the government assigning his daughter a Social 
Security number.  The second was an objection to the requirement that the father use the Social 
Security number in order to receive benefits for his child.  The former, I think, amounts to a “no 
burden,” because it is just about something the government is doing which—although the father may 
not like it—is not pressuring Bowen to do or change anything about this religious beliefs.  The latter, 
however, is a burden and so is a substantial religious burden if Bowen says it is.  The government is 
saying, “If you want benefits for your daughter, you must use this Social Security number.”  There is 
pressure and a choice Bowen has to make.  Bowen doesn’t want to have to make this choice, because 
either way, he loses.  He either loses the benefits (which we can stipulate amounts to a serious secular 
cost) or he becomes complicit in doing something that is against his religion.  For this second burden, we 
go to the compelling interest and least restrictive means analysis.   
 My sense is that Bowen one of the better lenses through which to view the cases now 
proceeding through the courts regarding the contraceptive mandate.  The cases are not Hobby Lobby, 
they are Hobby Lobby 2.42   So let me say a little bit about my last example, Extra Paperwork.  In it and 
cases like it, the government has provided an exemption to the contraceptive mandate to various 
religious non-profits, such as universities.  The exemption is not that they do not have to provide 
contraceptive coverage to those students who attend the university, or who work for it.  (This is what 
these religious non-profits probably really want.43)  Rather, the exemption means that the government 
will arrange 1) that contraceptive coverage is provided and that 2) the non-profits themselves do not 
have to be involved in paying for it.  This is precisely the “least restrictive means” that was put forth as a 
model in the Hobby Lobby case.  But the non-profits in these cases don’t like the accommodation, and 
don’t think it goes far enough, because the non-profits object to having to fill out the form that grants 
them the objection.  They think that this—the filling out the form—is a burden on their religious beliefs 
and a substantial one.  They don’t want to fill out the form. 
I find myself inclined to agree with them, but it really depends on how we understand the facts and 
the nature of the university’s objection.  One way of considering that objection is that filling out the 
paperwork is itself a burden—that it is cumbersome to have to ask for an accommodation.  This goes to 
                                                          
40
 This leads to my favored reading of the text.  A burden is substantial only insofar as the government is in some 
sense causing the burden.  Otherwise, it may be a burden, but it is not a substantial one for the purposes of RFRA.   
41
  Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).   
42
 Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014).  
43
 They want, in other words, want to be treated like “houses of worship” are now treated under the law. 
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how large the secular cost is, and maybe some plaintiffs will say this—that the government is asking too 
much to get out of the religious burden that they face.  Although I suggested that I had some sympathy 
for the idea that we defer to plaintiffs as to whether something is too great a secular cost, I think this is 
probably a loser, and no one has made this particular claim.  If anything is going to be a de minimis 
secular cost, it is filling out a two-page form.  I do not, though, say that having to go to great lengths to 
get an accommodation will never be a substantial burden, because sometimes it will be.44     
A second way of considering the objection is that the university doesn’t want to be a “trigger” for 
contraceptive coverage.  But the problem putting the burden this way is that filing out the form doesn’t 
itself trigger the coverage.  In his decision in the Notre Dame case, Judge Posner is quite right in rejecting 
Notre Dame’s argument that by filling out the form Notre Dame is somehow facilitating the provision of 
contraceptive coverage.   They aren’t.  The government is going to provide that coverage either way, 
that is, whether Notre Dame fills out the form.   The form just tells the government that Notre Dame 
wants to be accommodated: it tells the government, in other words, precisely that they are not going to 
do any of the facilitating.  Compare this to an analogous Bowen case.  Suppose Bowen was under the 
impression that by filling out a form that asks for benefits for his daughter, he would be authorizing the 
government to give his daughter a Social Security number.  But it turns out this is false.  The government 
is going to give his daughter a Social Security number no matter what he did, whether he fills out a form 
or not.  So there is not really a burden, because of Bowen’s false beliefs about what filling out the form 
does.   
There is a larger point here, and a significant one.  If courts are going to inquire into whether there is 
a bare burden, whether the plaintiffs’ beliefs are true about how the government program works is 
going to be part of this analysis.  If a person believes that his income taxes are going to pay for the 
building of monument to Satan and this is false, then the plaintiff can’t say that there is a burden 
because the government is putting him to a choice between paying taxes and erecting a Satanic statute.  
There is no burden because there is no choice.  If Posner is saying that Notre Dame is wrong because it 
has made a factual mistake about whether it is acting as a “trigger,” then I agree with Posner: there is no 
burden at all, let alone a substantial one.  Notre Dame is just objecting to a government program it 
doesn’t like, one which happens to provide contraceptive coverage to its students.  If this is the way that 
the plaintiffs in these cases are characterizing their burden, then they should lose. There is no burden, 
which is to say, there is not a “bare burden.”45     
This may not be all Notre Dame is complaining about; there may be yet a third way to conceptualize 
the “burden” here.   Go back to Bowen.  Suppose in Bowen, Bowen had to fill out a form saying that he 
objected to having to provide his daughter’s Social Security number if the government was going to give 
his daughter benefits.   On this variation, he has to fill out a form to say he objects to filling out a further 
form.  He believes (let’s say) that this burdens his religious practice because filling out that form 
somehow suggests that the Social Security system is legitimate, that it is OK to give everyone a number.  
He is saying that filling out the form is the burden, not the government giving his daughter a Social 
Security number (which we can presume the government will do in any case).  If Bowen doesn’t fill out 
the exemption form, he loses any chance at getting his daughter benefits.  I say this is still a burden, 
because it is putting Bowen to a choice: fill out this form or forget about your daughter getting the 
benefits.  So too Notre Dame might object to filling out a form saying that it objects to the 
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 United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).   
45
 It is possible that in Hobby Lobby there actually was no burden.  The plaintiffs in that case thought that some of 
the drugs mandated by the Affordable Care Act caused abortions.  But suppose that they actually did not.  Does it 
follow that the plaintiffs were not burdened at all by the mandate?  If the science was uncontested, and no 
reasonable person could believe that the drugs were abortion-causing, then I think it would follow that there 
would be no burden.     
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accommodation—because it suggests to Notre Dame that the system of providing contraception to its 
employees that the ACA has set up is OK.   
We may think that this burden is too attenuated to come close to being “substantial”—how is Notre 
Dame in any way responsible, if it is just objecting to a form that really does nothing to advance the 
goals of the ACA?  But that decision is not up to us and not for courts to police.  It is not up to courts to 
say that filling out the form washes the institution’s hands clean from sin or whether it is just another, 
different way of dirtying them.   If Notre Dame sees the burden the latter way, then my partially 
subjectivist view says they should win at this stage: they have shown a burden and if they say that 
burden is “substantial,” then we shouldn’t say that it isn’t.  Our only question is whether government 
putting pressure on them to do something that they see as a substantial burden on their religion.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 If we adopt the partially subjectivist view this tells us very little in the abstract about whether 
more or fewer religious plaintiffs will win in the end.   It may be that allowing more plaintiffs to claim 
that they face a religious burden, courts will be more searching as to whether those beliefs are really 
sincere , viz.,  whether plaintiffs really believe that missing this meal or signing this form is a burden on 
their religious beliefs.  I don’t think this is a good idea—it is against the tenor of the arguments in Part 
III--but it may happen.   It could also be that if we adopt the subjective view as the right view of RFRA, 
courts will respond by a) finding substantial burdens more often but b) also finding strong compelling 
interests more often.  The upshot would be that cases that use to lose at the substantial burden stage 
will still lose, but this time at the compelling interest stage.   In many of the prisoner cases, for example, 
I think this is what should happen: the interest the prison has in enforcing a lock-down will usually justify 
a prisoner missing a few religious meals.  The loss of those meals is still unfortunate, there is still a cost, 
but it can be all things considered justified.  And to my mind, it is better that it be justified in this way (if 
it is to be justified) because it at least acknowledges the trade-off.  Holding that there is no burden in 
these cases is too easy; it lets us ignore the conflicts there are really there.46   
 But seeing the partially subjectivist view as the right view in interpreting RFRA may lead us to a 
broader normative conclusion.  Maybe there is something bad about a proliferation of rights claims, 
even when those claims in the end lose.  Seeing all these substantial burden claims as legitimately 
asserted may make us think twice about seeing all of them as legitimate claims.  Subjectivism, after all, is 
usually not a word of praise, and that the partially subjective view is the best way of interpreting RFRA 
may lead us to say “all the worse for RFRA.”    
Maybe instead of giving subjective opinions of substantial burdens their due, we should just 
shut the whole thing down.  This is not an indefensible position, and it is not inconsistent with agreeing 
with everything I’ve said in this paper.  My conclusion is only: if we are to have something like RFRA, and 
we want to say that RFRA only applies when there are “substantial burdens” on religion, the best way of 
interpreting that phrase is mostly subjective.  If we are going to accommodate people’s religious beliefs, 
then it should be mostly up to them—and not to us—what sorts of burdens on religious belief are 
substantial enough to merit an accommodation.   
                                                          
46
 I take this to be one of the key insights of Isaiah Berlin’s pluralism: we should be aware when values are really in 
conflict, and when there is a choice to be made, and loss happens no matter what we choose.  There is something 
worthwhile about seeing the conflict for what it is, rather than trying to deny that it is really there (e.g., that there 
is no burden, so no need to see whether the governmental interest outweighs).   
